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of those Laws on Technology Transfers 
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!
 
 This research examines United States and Japanese laws regarding patent rights in collaborative 
inventions, and inquires whether these laws may impede technology transfers by creating uncertainty regarding 
the ownership, validity, or enforceability of the resulting patents, or by imposing undue obstacles to the licensing 
or assignment of such patents.  Where the laws of the two countries differ, this paper compares the merits of 
each approach and also assesses whether the differing approaches could be troublesome for cross-border 
transactions.  
 One of the most significant differences between United States and Japanese law regarding joint inventions 
is in the requirement of consent for certain activities involving a jointly owned patent.  In Japan, unlike the 
United States, all joint owners of a patent must consent to a non-exclusive license of the patent, or to the transfer 
of a single joint owner’s share, while in the United States, unlike Japan, a jointly owned patent cannot be 
enforced through an infringement action without the consent of all joint owners.   Thus, while the consent 
requirements differ in the two countries, in each case they can present obstacles to the full enjoyment of a joint 
owner’s share of the patent. 
 In both countries, the definition of joint inventorship is imprecise, and even honest mistakes in identifying 
which persons qualify as joint inventors can lead to invalidation.  In the United States, such errors can often 
be corrected without invalidating the patent, but in Japan, no such correction mechanism exists.   
 Finally, in light of recent Japanese court decisions on the subject of remuneration for employee inventions, 
employer allocations of remuneration in the future will need to carefully identify and quantify the respective 
contributions of all joint inventors.  Such precision is generally not required in the United States.  
!
!
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$ Introduction 
 
When a patentable invention arises from 
collaborative research, who has the legal right to 
obtain a patent for that invention?  If several 
parties jointly own the right to obtain the patent, 
or share ownership of the patent itself, what are 
their respective rights with respect to exploiting 
or enforcing the patent?  Do the current legal 
rules facilitate or impede the exploitation and 
transfer of patented technology? 
These issues have received considerable 
attention in the United States, where identifying 
joint inventors can be essential to determining 
patent priority.  In Japan, issues of joint 
inventorship and joint patent ownership have 
generally received less scrutiny.  However, such 
questions have begun to receive greater attention 
in Japan, due in part to aggressive judicial 
interpretation of the rules governing 
compensation for employee inventions, and in 
part to the emergence of universities as joint 
owners of patents arising from collaborations with 
the private sector. 
 In both countries, important legal issues 
pertaining to joint inventorship and joint patent 
ownership include (1) defining joint inventorship; 
(2) the legal rights of joint inventors; (3) the 
ownership rights of joint inventors who 
contribute to fewer than all of the claims; (4) the 
consequences of errors in identifying joint 
inventors; and (5) the impact of joint inventorship 
issues on employee inventions.   
 This article examines the law of joint 
inventorship and joint patent ownership in both 
the United States and Japan, and considers how 
these laws may promote or impede the 
exploitation of patented technology. (*1) 
 
% Defining Joint Inventorship 
 
1 United States 
 
 In the United States, an inventor is the 
individual who “conceives” an invention. 
“Conception” means the “formation in the mind 
of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea 
of the complete and operative invention, as it is 
(*)  William S. Boyd Professor of Law! William S. Boyd School of Law University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
(*1) This article summarizes a longer report which the author prepared for the Institute of Intellectual Property (IIP), 
Tokyo.  The author would like to thank IIP for its generous sponsorship of this project, the entire staff of IIP for 
their assistance and support, and the many Japanese legal experts who agreed to be interviewed for this research. 
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hereafter to be applied in practice.”(*2) An idea is 
sufficiently “definite and permanent” when “only 
ordinary skill would be necessary to reduce the 
invention to practice, without extensive research 
or experimentation.” (*3) 
 In order for a conception to lead to a patentable 
invention, the conception must be “reduced to 
practice,” which requires that someone “actually 
perform or carry out the conceived invention.” (*4) 
Although reduction to practice is essential to 
patentability, (*5) a person whose sole contribution 
to the invention was to reduce it to practice is not 
considered an inventor. (*6) 
 For an invention to be joint, it must be “the 
product of the collaboration of the inventive 
endeavors of two or more persons working 
together toward the same end and producing an 
invention by their aggregate efforts.”(*7) They 
need not work together physically or at the same 
time, they need not make the same amount or 
type of contribution, and they need not each 
contribute to the subject matter of every claim.(*8) 
To qualify as a joint inventor, a person must 
contribute to the conception of the invention, not 
merely its reduction to practice.(*9) To contribute 
to the conception, it is not enough to suggest the 
general idea of the result to be accomplished 
rather than the means to accomplish it.(*10) Thus, 
an employer or entrepreneur’s general request 
that someone create a product to accomplish a 
task is not a joint inventorship contribution to 
that product.(*11) 
Ambiguity often arises when a person with 
specialized skills or knowledge assists the person 
who came up with the detailed conception of the 
invention. It is recognized that “an inventor ‘may 
use the services, ideas and aid of others in the 
process of perfecting his invention without losing 
his right to a patent.” (*12) However, it can often be 
difficult to determine whether a person who 
contributes such expertise has contributed to the 
conception itself, or has merely exercised the 
ordinary level of skill in the art.(*13)   
 
2 Japan 
 
 In Japan, the concept of inventorship and the 
standards for  determining which collaborative 
contributions qualify as joint inventorship are 
generally similar to those in the United States, 
and equally challenging to apply.  
 Determining who qualifies as a joint inventor 
can be extremely difficult. It is clear, however, that 
a joint inventor must participate in the creation of 
the technical idea(s) of the invention, (*14) and that 
it is not sufficient to be a mere assistant, advisor, 
or fundraiser, or to be the one who merely orders 
the work to be accomplished. (*15) 
(*3)  Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting 1 Robinson on Patents 
532 (1890)), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987). 
(*4)  Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1070 
(1996). 
(*5)  Oregon Health & Sci. Univ. v. Vertex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 233 F. Supp.2d 1282, 1289 (D.Or. 2002). 
(*6)  Under U.S. law, a reduction to practice may be either actual (building the invention, making the composition of 
matter, or using the process) or constructive (providing an enabling description in the patent application).  Thus, it 
is not necessary to actually build or use the invention in a tangible sense in order to obtain the patent. 
(*7)  See, e.g., Applegate v. Scherer, 332 F.2d 571 (CCPA 1964);  35 U.S.C. § 102(f). 
(*8)  Monsanto Co. v. Kamp, 269 F. Supp. 818, 824 (D.D.C. 1967); see also Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1227 ("A joint 
invention is the product of a collaboration between two or more persons working together to solve the problem 
addressed."); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911, 915-16 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
(*9)  35 U.S. C. § 116.  Although joint inventors need not physically work together, they must “collaborate” in the 
sense of communicating with one another during the conception process, and must knowingly working toward the 
same goal.  Monsanto, 269 F. Supp. at 824; Kimberly-Clark,  973 F.2d at 916. 
(*10) Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 923 (1998); 
Huang v. Calif. Inst. of Tech., 72 USPQ2d  1161 (Feb. 18, 2004) (citing Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1351 
(Fed. Cir. 1998)). Sometimes the attempt to reduce an invention to practice reveals that the conception is in fact 
incomplete.  Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d  at 1229. Under these circumstances, one who participates in 
completing the conception through experimentation or similar activities may make a sufficient contribution to 
qualify as a joint inventor.   This is frequently true of chemical inventions.  See Board of Ed. ex rel Board of 
Trustees of Florida State University v. American Bioscience, Inc., 333 F.3d 1330, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
(*11) Garrett Corp. v. United States, 422 F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 951 (1970). 
(*12) Hayhurst v. Rosen, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7312, *28, 1992 WL 123178, at *11 (citing Morgan v. Hirsch, 728 F.2d 
1449, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
(*13) Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 624 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting Hobbs v. United 
States Atomic Energy Comm’n, 451 F.2d 849, 864 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
(*14) See, e.g., Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1468-69 (Newman, J., dissenting); American Bioscience, 333 F.3d at 1341-42. 
(*15) Modalities for Employees’ Inventions System, IIP Bulletin, vol. 12, page 20 (2003) (citing Nakayama,  Kogyo 
Shoyuken Hou (Jo) Tokkyo Hou (Indus. Prop. Law -- Book I, Patent Law), Part II, Ch. 1, Sec. 1, Subsec. 1, Item 1.2 
(expanded 2d ed., Koubundu 2000) (translated at http://www.iip.jp.or/translation); Yoshifuji & Kumagai, Tokkyo Hou 
Gaisetsu (Overview of Patent Law) 187-88 (revised & enlarged 13th ed., Yuhikaku 1998)). 
(*16) Nakayama, supra note 14, Part II, Ch. 1, Sec. 1, Subsec. 1, Item 1.2. 
2 ybritech, Inc. v. o oclo al ti i , I .,  .  ,  . 
3 urroughs ellco e o. . arr r t ri , I .,  .  ,  . 
4 regon ealth  Sci. niv. v. ertex Phar aceuticals, Inc., 233 . Supp.2d 1282, 1289 ( . r. 2002). 
5 nder . . la , a r cti  t  r ti    l
6 See, e.g., pplegate v. Scherer, 332 F.2d 571 ( P  1964);  35 .S. . § 102(f). 
7 onsanto o. v. a p, 269 . . ,  ( . . . );   
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 Professors Yoshifuji and Kumagai distinguish 
joint inventors from other collaborators by noting 
that a joint inventor must provide “substantial 
cooperation” rather than “insubstantial 
cooperation” in “the creation of technical ideas.” (*16) 
This standard would generally exclude an 
assistant who merely followed instructions,(*17) a 
supervisor or customer who provided the general 
theme for the work without providing a concrete 
conception,(*18) and a person who merely funded 
the research.(*19) If one person provides a 
concrete but incomplete idea, and another person 
completes the idea through the act of 
materializing it into a working device, they are 
joint inventors.(*20) However, one who merely 
produces manufacturing drawings depicting 
another person’s complete conception of an 
invention is not a joint inventor.(*21)  
 There is a strong consensus that joint 
inventors need not make equal contributions to an 
invention in order to be joint owners of the right 
to obtain the patent.  It is somewhat less clear 
under current law whether their ownership of the 
right to obtain the patent should reflect the 
inventors’ proportionate contributions, or should 
be deemed to be equal. It would seem that the 
most practical approach, however, is to treat the 
joint inventors as equal owners unless they 
specify otherwise by contract.  
 
& The individual rights of joint 
inventors  
 
 Unlike the general standards for determining 
joint inventorship, the laws regarding the rights 
of individual joint inventors and joint patent 
owners are quite different in Japan and the United 
States. 
 
1 United States 
 
 In the United States, a patent application is 
filed by the inventors, not their assignees. 
Although the law generally requires that joint 
inventors make their patent application jointly, a 
subgroup of the joint inventors may file the patent 
application if the omitted inventors either have 
refused to join in the application “or cannot be 
found or reached after diligent effort.” (*22) In such 
a case, the joint inventors who file the application 
must do so on behalf of all of the inventors.  
 Each joint owner of a patent is free to work 
the patent, with no duty to share the proceeds 
with the other joint owner(s).(*23) One joint owner 
may unilaterally execute a non-exclusive license, 
with no duty to share the royalties,(*24) or may 
unilaterally assign his or her individual share of 
the patent. (*25) These rules encourage maximum 
exploitation of the patent by each joint owner. 
However, the consent of all joint owners is 
required to execute an assignment or an 
exclusive license of the patent.(*26) Any of these 
rules may be altered by contract. 
 Absent an agreement to the contrary, the 
consent of all joint owners is also required in 
order to initiate an infringement action.  In 
Ethicon v. United States Surgical,(*27) an alleged 
infringer succeeded in blocking an infringement 
suit by proving that the patent applicant 
inadvertently failed to name a joint inventor (who 
had made small contributions to only two out of 
55 claims), and by persuading the omitted 
inventor to refuse to cooperate in the suit.  
Although the patent was still valid (because such 
inventorship errors are correctible under U.S. 
law), the patent was unenforceable against the 
infringer.  Thus, the combined effect of (1) 
treating all joint inventors as equal owners of the 
patent, and (2) requiring unanimous consent to an 
infringement action, could undermine the 
enforceability, and thus the marketability, of any 
patent as to which a joint inventor might have 
been inadvertently omitted. 
 
2 Japan 
 
 In Japan, all joint inventors must consent to 
any assignment of a joint inventor’s share of the 
(*16) Yoshifuji & Kumagai, supra note 14, at 187-89. 
(*17) Id. 
(*18) Tokyo High Court, Judgment by the 6th Civil Division, Dec. 24, 1991, Hanrei Jiho, No. 1417: p. 108 (the 
Automatically-Boiled Shrimp case) ([Annotation] Katsua Tamai, Jurist [Jurisuto], No. 1050: p. 180);  Tokyo High 
Court Decision of August 15, 1985, S 59 (Gyou-Ke) No. 58. 
(*19) Yoshifuji & Kumagai, supra note 14, at 187-89 . 
(*20) Tokyo High Court Decision of April 27, 1976, Torikeshishu (Court Decisions in Suits against Appeal/Trial 
Decisions) 1976, S47 (“Gyou Ke”) 25, p. 449 (the Mahjong-Rule Pachinko case) (translation supplied by the 
Institute of Intellectual Property (IIP), Tokyo). 
(*21) Tokyo District Court Decision of April 16, 1979, The Law Times Report [Hanrei Taimuzu],  No. 395: p. 155 (the 
Grain Processing Method case). 
(*22) 35 U.S.C. § 116. 
(*23) Ethicon, 135 F.3d  at 1468;  35 U.S.C. § 262. 
(*24) Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1468. 
(*25) See generally Continental American Corp. v. Barton, 1991 U.S.App. LEXIS 8505 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
(*26) Id. 
(*27) Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1465-69; Willingham v. Lawton, 555 F.2d 1340, 1344 (6th Cir. 1977). 
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right to obtain a patent, and all joint owners of the 
right to obtain the patent (whether inventors or 
their assignees) must consent to the application; 
if even one joint owner fails to consent, the patent 
cannot issue, or will be subject to invalidation. (*28) 
 An employer seeking a patent for an 
employee invention must be careful, therefore, to 
determine whether any person(s) other than its 
own employee(s) (who typically have assigned 
their rights to the employer) might qualify as 
joint inventors.  Where two or more companies 
engage in joint research, for example, the 
contributions of each company’s employees would 
need to be carefully documented in order to 
determine which (one or more) of the companies 
owns the right to obtain the patent.  The same 
consideration would apply to a collaboration 
between a company and a university. 
 In Japan, the restrictions imposed by Section 
73 on technology transfer involving jointly owned 
patents are a source of concern among many joint 
patent owners. According to that provision, one 
joint owner of a patent “may neither transfer his 
share nor establish a pledge upon it without the 
consent of all the other joint owners.” Although 
each may work the patented invention without 
the consent of the others, unanimous consent is 
required in order to license the patent, either 
exclusively or non-exclusively. 
 The purpose of the joinder requirements for 
licensing and for assignments and pledges of 
individual ownership shares is apparently to 
protect weaker companies from the risk that 
another joint owner of their patent might license 
it, or assign a share, to a stronger competitor of 
the weak company.  However, in some cases one 
joint owner is not in a position to work the patent 
which it jointly owns. This joint owner (which 
might be another company or a university) can 
derive little benefit from its share of the patent 
unless it assigns or licenses its share, which it 
will be unable to do without the other joint 
owner’s consent.  If the party that cannot work 
the patent has sufficient bargaining power, it may 
be able to negotiate with the other party for 
consent to a license or for a share of the profits 
derived from working the patent. An alternative 
that would protect universities and weaker 
companies that lack such bargaining power would 
be to eliminate the consent requirement, at least 
for non-exclusive licenses.  Although one joint 
owner might license the patent to a powerful 
competitor of the other joint owner, this option 
would be equally available to both joint owners.  
 Section 73 may also impede the borrowing 
ability of a joint patent owner, by interfering with 
the owner’s ability to pledge a patent share as 
collateral, and by interfering with the involuntary 
disposition of the patent share in bankruptcy. At 
the very least, the law in this area should be 
clarified. Preferably, the law should facilitate 
borrowing so that small companies that jointly 
own patents can raise the capital they need to 
more effectively exploit those patents, and to 
fund further research. One possible way to 
accomplish this would be to give the other joint 
patent owners the right to buy back an 
encumbered patent share at some 
objectively-determined price, but only in the 
event of bankruptcy or default on the 
collateralized loan. 
 Although Japan has no statutes or case law 
precisely on point, most experts agree that one 
joint patent owner can bring suit against an 
infringer, and obtain injunctive relief, without the 
consent of the other owners. This view gains 
support from the Japan Supreme Court’s 
Judgment of March 25, 2002,(*29) holding that a 
single joint patent owner could unilaterally 
initiate a proceeding to revoke a Japanese Patent 
Office (JPO) decision invalidating the patent’s 
registration. Although the Court did not indicate 
whether its conclusion would also apply to other 
types of unilateral legal actions by a joint inventor 
– such as an action against an infringer -- its 
decision supports the broad principle that each 
individual joint owner should have the power to 
protect the patent against extinguishment.  This 
is the opposite of the U.S. approach, as 
exemplified in Ethicon, which makes jointly 
owned patents more difficult to enforce than 
patents with sole owners. 
 The same principle should permit a single 
joint owner to pursue an action for damages 
arising from infringement. The problem here lies 
in determining the amount of damages. Many 
experts believe that such plaintiffs should recover 
only their allocable share of the total damages 
that would have been awarded if all of the joint 
owners had joined in the suit – in other words, 
damages should be proportionate to a plaintiff ’s 
share of the patent. This approach offers the 
advantage of simplicity, and mirrors Article 117 of 
Japanese copyright law. As Professor Nakayama 
has noted, however, this approach is not without 
its own complexities, such as the question of how 
(*28) Section 38 provides that “[w]here the right to obtain a patent is owned jointly, the patent may only be applied for 
jointly by all the joint owners.” Failure of any owner to consent to the application is grounds for rejecting the 
application under Section 49(ii) or invalidating the patent under Section 123(1)(ii). 
(*29) Minshu Vol. 56, No. 3, at page 574. (Case number 2001 (Gyo-hi) No. 154).  The court’s reasoning in this case 
closely paralleled its reasoning just one month earlier in a trademark case presenting the same issue.  See Japan 
Supreme Court Judgment of February 2, 2002, Minshu Vol. 56, No. 2, at 348 (Case number 2001 (Gyo-hi) No. 142).
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to calculate a damages award for a plaintiff who 
owns only a small percentage of the patent but is 
in fact working the patent more extensively than 
the other owners, or perhaps is the only one who 
is actually working the patent.(*30) In light of these 
complexities, it is not surprising that Professor 
Monya questions the wisdom of the Article 117 
approach, since it could lead to inconsistent 
rulings for different plaintiffs based on the same 
acts of alleged infringement; instead, he suggests, 
the nonconsenting owners should be joined in the 
lawsuit as involuntary defendants.     
 
("Where a patent contains multiple 
claims, does it matter whether a 
joint inventor contributed to 
more than one claim? 
 
1 United States 
 
 According to Ethicon, the joint inventor of 
one claim is a joint owner of all claims combined 
in the same patent.(*31) Therefore, the joint 
inventor of even a single claim in a patent, or that 
inventor’s assignee, has the power to block 
assignments or exclusive licenses of the entire 
patent, to bar infringement litigation, and to grant 
non-exclusive licenses of the entire patent.  
Under current law, it is unclear whether joint 
patent owners can contract with one another 
regarding ownership of specific claims.   
 
2 Japan 
 
 Although Japanese law has not directly 
addressed the question, most experts believe that, 
in the absence of a contract among all of the joint 
inventors, each would be presumed to own an 
equal share in the right to patent the joint 
invention.  
 A somewhat different question pertains to 
the ownership of the patent itself. Under current 
law, it is unclear whether a joint inventor (or the 
assignee of the joint inventor) who contributed to 
fewer than all of the claims in the patent would be 
a joint owner of all the other claims as well, or 
even whether a contract allocating patent 
ownership on a claim-by-claim basis could be 
enforced.(*32) This question could be important 
where one or more claims of a joint patent are 
subsequently invalidated.  If one of the joint 
owners was the inventor (or assignee of the 
inventor) of the invalidated claims, but not of the 
still-valid claims, should that party still be treated 
as a joint owner of the entire patent? 
 Finally, employers attempting to comply with 
Section 35’s requirement of “reasonable 
remuneration” for employee inventions will want 
some clarification of the rules pertaining to an 
employee’s remuneration rights where the 
employee contributed to only some of the claims. 
Should the remuneration depend on the amount 
of profit derived from exploiting only those 
particular claims, or the entire patent?  What if 
those particular claims are not exploited at all, 
but revenue is generated by other claims of the 
patent?  Similarly, if those claims were rejected 
by the JPO, or are subsequently held to be invalid, 
is that employee still entitled to remuneration 
based on profits derived from other claims in the 
same patent? 
 
' Consequences of Errors in 
Identifying Joint Inventors 
 
1 United States 
 
 Regardless of whether the inventors have 
already assigned their rights, a valid U.S. patent 
must precisely identify the true inventor(s) of the 
claimed invention. A patent application may be 
rejected, and a patent may be invalidated, for 
either overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness in 
identifying joint inventors. (*33) 
 Where the inventorship error is not due to 
deceptive intent, rejection or invalidation can 
generally be avoided by invoking one of two 
corrections mechanisms -- section 116 (applicable 
during the application process) or section 256 
(applicable after the patent issues). However, 
priority of inventorship could still be lost, 
potentially invalidating the U.S. patent, if the 
patent’s priority date is based on the activities of a 
party who is later determined to have been 
improperly included in the inventorship group.(*34) 
 
2 Japan 
 
 Although a Japanese patent application must 
name the true inventors, failure to do so is not 
(*30) See Nakayama, supra note 14, Part II, Sec. 6, Subsec. 2, nn.5 & 6. 
(*31) 135 F.3d at 1465-66. 
(*32) Under Section 27 of the Japan Patent Office Regulations, joint inventors or joint patentees who wish to resolve 
their respective ownership rights by contractual agreement may do so, provided that they provide notice and 
documentation to the Patent Office.  However, it is not clear whether a claim-by-claim division of rights could be 
effected through this mechanism. 
(*33) 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(f),  111(a)(1). 
(*34) This is because the United States bases priority on the date of invention rather than the date of filing. See, e.g., 
Kimberly-Clark,  973 F.2d at 916. 
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grounds for invalidation.(*35) However, under 
Section 38, if any joint owner of the right to 
obtain the patent failed to consent to the filing of 
the application, the application should be rejected 
under Section 49(ii), or the patent, once issued, 
will be invalidated under Section 123(1)(ii).(*36) In 
contrast to the liberal rules allowing correction of 
inventorship errors in the United States, 
Japanese law does not permit post-registration 
correction of a failure to obtain this unanimous 
consent. 
 Because patent applicants in Japan are 
typically not the actual inventors, but their 
assignees, uncertainties about inventorship can 
be reduced by making sure that all possible joint 
inventors have assigned their rights to the patent 
applicants. This is ordinarily the case where the 
joint inventors are all employed by the same 
company, but it would require special attention 
where the invention arose from collaborations 
among several companies, or between a company 
and university personnel (faculty or students).  
In such a case, a competitor could take advantage 
of an underinclusiveness error in order to 
invalidate the patent. (*37) 
 Because Japanese patent law does not 
distinguish deliberate misrepresentations from 
inadvertent errors in this context, even an honest 
mistake as to inventorship, or as to the validity of 
an assignment agreement, could lead to 
invalidation. This result seems unjust with 
respect to the excluded inventor as well as any 
other joint inventors or assignees who acted 
without fraudulent intent, since the invalidation 
will extinguish their patent rights.  
 Recognizing the harshness of this result, in 
2001 the Japan Supreme Court carved out an 
apparent exception where one of the applicants 
had forged an assignment from a joint inventor. 
The aggrieved joint inventor initiated a legal 
action to correct the application. However, before 
that legal action could be resolved, the patent 
examination was completed, and the patent was 
registered, with the forger’s name in place of the 
true joint inventor’s.(*38) Concluding that 
invalidation would be unfair to the true inventors 
in this case, the Supreme Court ordered the 
transfer of the forger’s share to the true joint 
inventor. It is not clear, however, whether the 
Court would have reached the same conclusion if 
the error had been inadvertent rather than 
deliberate, or if the defrauded inventor had 
initiated his action after the patent had already 
been registered. 
 A better solution would be to amend the 
patent statutes to allow for corrections where the 
error in obtaining consent arises from honest 
misjudgments about joint inventorship.  This 
would protect the reliance interests of all of the 
parties who share ownership of the right to obtain 
the patent, as well as the subsequent assignees or 
licensees of the defective patent.  
 
( How do joint inventorship 
issues affect rights in employee 
inventions? 
 
1 United States 
 
 U.S. law does not require employers to 
compensate employees for their inventions; thus, 
employers are not constrained by the federal 
definition of joint inventorship in determining 
whether and how to reward employees for their 
inventions. The existence and amount of 
compensation for employee inventions is dictated 
by market forces, due to the mobility of the 
American workforce. Where a company does 
provide such compensation, it does not 
necessarily reflect the relative significance of 
each employee’s contribution. 
 
2 Japan 
 
 In Japan, errors in identifying the 
inventorship group can have a serious impact on 
the question of reasonable remuneration under 
Section 35. If non-inventors (such as supervisors 
or executives) are included in the compensation 
pool, the allocation to the true inventors would 
almost certainly be deemed unreasonable, since 
the method of allocation would not reflect the 
invention contributions of the parties.  Similarly, 
if an employee’s inventive contribution is 
erroneously disregarded, that employee could 
challenge this under Section 35. Even if the 
(*35) Nakayama, supra note 14, at Part II, Ch.1, Sec.1, Subsec.1, Item.1(5). 
(*36) Under Section 33, while the right to obtain a patent may be transferred, “the joint owner of the right to obtain a 
patent may not assign his share without the consent of all the other joint owners.” However, this is not grounds for 
rejection under Section 49 or invalidation under Section 123. 
(*37) The invalidation consequence is illustrated in the Judgment of the 6th Civil Division of the Tokyo High Court, Dec. 
24, 1991, Hanrei Jiho, No. 1417: p. 108 (the Automatically-Boiled Shrimp case) ([Annotation] Katsua Tamai, Jurist 
[Jurisuto], No. 1050: p. 180), which cancelled a JPO Trial Decision upholding the validity of a utility model 
registration. In that case, the registrant had claimed to be the sole inventor of a device which was in fact the sole 
invention of another person.  The facts of the case suggest that the registrant’s misrepresentation was deliberate 
rather than inadvertent. 
(*38) Judgment of June 12, 2001, Case number 1997 (0) No. 1918, Minsu Vol. 55, No. 4, at page 793. 
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inventorship group is identified correctly, a 
dissatisfied employee could challenge the 
respective allocations within the group. 
 Recent court decisions interpreting 
“reasonable remuneration” for employee inventions 
under Section 35 have caused employers to 
reexamine their remuneration policies.(*39) The 
new version of Section 35, taking effect on April 1, 
2005, emphasizes the importance of adopting 
reasonable procedures to determine the amount 
of remuneration awarded.(*40)  
 The Aspartame/Ajinomoto case, decided by 
the Tokyo District Court on February 24, 2004, 
indicates that a “reasonable” allocation of Section 
35 remuneration must reflect the actual 
contributions of each employee/inventor. In that 
case, the employees had followed the customary 
practice of deciding among themselves how their 
Section 35 remuneration should be allocated, 
awarding a 5/6 share to the most senior and 
highly placed inventor, without careful analysis of 
the actual significance of each person’s 
contribution.  Based on a detailed analysis of the 
employees’ respective contributions to the 
invention, however, the District Court 
determined that the senior employee was entitled 
to only a 50% share (although it increased the 
overall remuneration amount).  A court would 
probably undertake a similar analysis under the 
new version of Section 35.  Thus, a thorough 
understanding of joint inventorship is now 
essential to compliance with Section 35. 
 
) Conclusions 
 
 Although the concept of joint inventorship is 
similar in the United States and Japan, in both 
systems the legal standards can be difficult to 
apply in practice.   This can lead to inadvertent 
errors; in close cases, a court’s judgment might 
simply differ from that of the patentee(s).  Japan 
may wish to consider adopting some type of 
correction mechanism so that fewer patents will 
be vulnerable to invalidation under Section 38 due 
to inventorship errors. 
 Joinder requirements can be problematic in 
the United States and Japan, but in different 
contexts.  In the United States, the requirement 
that all joint patent owners consent to an 
infringement suit means that an inventorship 
error as to even a single claim can render an 
entire patent unenforceable, whereas the 
Japanese trend toward allowing unilateral 
enforcement better protects the value of patents.  
In Japan, the joinder problem arises in the context 
of licensing, pledging, and assignments of shares; 
in particular, the consent requirement for 
non-exclusive licensing, while intended to protect 
smaller companies, may in fact disadvantage them, 
and it appears to disadvantage universities as 
well. 
 Although joint inventorship issues have not 
caused many problems for Japanese employers in 
the past, careful documentation of joint 
inventorship is now essential to compliance with 
Section 35, and continues to be essential to the 
validity of U.S. patents.  It will also be important 
in determining ownership of the right to obtain a 
patent that results from collaboration between 
employees of two companies, or between 
company employees and university faculty or 
students. 
 While it may never be possible to define joint 
inventorship in a way that eliminates the 
possibility of errors in judgment, a review of the 
patent laws pertaining to joint invention and joint 
patent ownership could lead to reforms which 
would enable both the United States and Japan to 
increase the marketability and stability of patents 
for joint inventions, and thereby encourage more 
collaborations among companies as well as 
universities. 
(*39) E.g., Olympus Optical Co., Ltd. v. Shunpei Tanaka, Case No. Heisei 13 (ju) No. 1256, 1822 Hanrei Jiho 39 (Sup. Ct. 
Apr. 22, 2003); Tokyo High Court Decision of May 22, 2001 (Hanrei Jiho No. 1753, p. 23); Yonezawa v. Hitachi, Case 
No. Heisei 14 (ne) 6451 (Tokyo High Court, Jan. 29, 2004); Nakamura v. Nichia Chemical, Case No. Heisei 13 (wa) 
17772 (Tokyo Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 2004) (the blue LED case). 
(*40) See Matsuo Nonaka, Current Developments: Japanese Legislative Updates on Intellectual Property in 2004, CASRIP 
Newsletter (Spring/Summer 2004). 
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